Digest Vol. 1, #7

Crackdowns in Kabardino-Balkaria: The regional authorities have recently embarked on a campaign to neutralize the potency of nationalities in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR), targeting both the Balkar and Circassian populations. The Nalchik city court decided to dissolve the Council of Elders of the Balkar People (Sovet stareishin balkarskogo naroda) and Bash-Tere. Activists have since claimed that the dissolution of SSBN was illegal. This move follows two trends. The first is the escalatory repression in the republic against supposedly nationalist organizations and individuals. In November and January, the authorities targeted academics for “anti-Russian” activities. The second trend is the broader strategy of repression, utilized to neutralize an active civil society, in Ingushetia. Here, similar organizations were also dissolved as greater pressure was applied to groups and individuals that were, in reality, non-threats. The trigger event for Ingushetia’s repressive campaign was mass protests in 2018.

Targeting Circassians, reports have surfaced of police confronting KBR natives publicly using the Circassian flag, rather than that of the republic. It should be noted that the Circassian flag is also that of the Republic of Adygea. The authorities have long attempted to suppress the Circassian identity. These tactics involve, among others, dividing Circassians into sub-ethnic groups in the census, stifling Circassian Memorial Day events, threatening to merge the Republic of Adygea with Krasnodar krai, and, most prominently, hosting the 2014 Sochi Olympic games on the site of Russia’s massacre and genocide of the Circassians in the mid-1800s. For context demographically, according to the 2020 census, in KBR there are currently residing: 502,615 Kabardins, 120,898 Balkars, and 174,768 Russians. Compared to 2010, the number of Russians decreased, the number of Balkars increased, and the proportion of Kabardins decreased. However, these statistics are not accurate, due to the Kremlin’s practice of making strange, arbitrary distinctions (not decided by the respective peoples themselves) between Adyghe, Kabardin, Cherkess, and Shapsugh, and Karachay and Balkar. Most Circassians reside outside of Russia.

The KBR authorities are seemingly growing more apprehensive of any potential channel for public discontent, be it an organization or an identity marker. This is partially because of increased acts of resistance. In the wake of sizable anti-mobilization protests, local security officials and partisan militants engaged in two firefights. Additionally, some Circassians have been fighting alongside Ukraine against Russia and diasporic activist leader Ibragim Yaganov has called on more to join their ranks. These events, while isolated, have proved sufficient to place the authorities on edge. As I cautioned several weeks ago, repression in the republic will likely continue to build as we approach Circassian Memorial Day on 21 May.

Kalimatov under threat: The 2023 edition of “Gubernatoropad” (“fall of governors”) has taken its first two victims in rapid succession. Now that the most recent drive to replace ill-performing governors has begun, eyes will turn to the most vulnerable man in the North Caucasus, and one of the most in Russia: Ingushetia’s Mahmud-Ali Kalimatov. Kalimatov has long been at risk of falling in a gubernatoropad, and recent events have certainly not helped his case. Over the past year, he has struggled to control Ingushetia’s residents. This has led to an incrementally stricter policy to neutralize civil society. In the case of the Batalkhadzhintsy brotherhood—once an ally of the regional government and the alternative power holder in the small republic—Kalimatov waged one last campaign to fully eliminate the group, with many raids and arrests of the leaders, forcing the group to seek refuge with Ramzan Kadyrov in neighboring Chechnya. Additionally, rumors that Ingushetia’s male population largely ignored and refused mobilization last September appeared to be confirmed by raids in January. Most recently, Kalimatov’s brother is now facing arrest due to his participation in an operation to embezzle two billion rubles from the Pension Fund of Russia. Perhaps Ingushetia’s incumbent will politically survive, but it should come as no surprise if he is retired.

Chechnya prepares for mobilization: Opposition movement Niyso reports that military commissariats in Chechnya are readying a new wave of mobilization orders. This matches reports for Russia at-large. Niyso has also stated that mobilization never stopped in Chechnya, and has continuously been conducted at a low intensity. It is doubtful that mobilization efforts in Chechnya will be publicized beyond opposition channels, due to the substantial blowback last September. After a protest in Grozny, Kadyrov switched the republic’s mobilization drive from ostentatious to silent, relying on abducting men from public spaces, particularly if they were attempting to escape their fate as cannon fodder. In case that it occurs, 1ADAT’s kidnapping statistics and individual reports are the best means of gauging the extent of another mobilization campaign.

Sanctions incoming: Khutmat Kadyrov, Ramzan’s 20-year-old daughter, was appointed “curator of the republic’s healthcare system.” Such a senior posting in the administration all but guarantees she will soon be placed under personal sanctions in the United States, like her sisters. Also occurring this week, 19-year-old Tabarik, who is already sanctioned, founded the “IRS GRUPP” in Chechnya. Allegedly working on “socio-economic development” projects, it has signed funding agreements with the Islamic Financial Group “Favorit” and the Sheikh Zayed Fund. Favorit finances various projects in Chechnya working toward the implementation of and adherence to sharia in the republic. The Sheikh Zayed Fund is a collaborative project between Kadyrov and then-President of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Expect IRS GRUPP to be sanctioned by the US Treasury Department imminently, considering they did so for Ayshat’s Firdaws LLC.

Other developments

Akhmat Kadyrov (the Younger) oversaw an Akhmat Kadyrov Fund humanitarian aid shipment to Syria, accompanied by high-ranking administration officials, indicating how his incorporation into the regime moves apace.

The Forum of Free Peoples of Post-Russia, in which various North Caucasus activists participate, was declared undesirable in Russia.

“Budzhetniki” are not being paid, with reports from Dagestan and Chechnya; this is a development to watch vis-a-vis protest risk.